H.A. Hellyer, a Cambridge University fellow, is a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He tweets at @hahellyer.
As most international media focuses on the United States and the broader NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the backdrop of last week remains set against a tremendous human cost. The reality is, Afghans have been paying the overwhelming brunt of that cost, not only because of how the withdrawal has been taking place but simply as a result of over two decades of intervention, going much further back than the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.
At the same time, however, beyond Afghanistan, there lies the continuation of another long moment in the world of geopolitics. One that is indelibly related to how we think about international order, Western involvement and what comes next for both.
One of the great myths of the latter half of the 20th century is that humanity had in some way “succeeded” in building a “liberal international order,” underpinned by deep commitments from the most powerful Western nations on the one hand and acquiescence by non-liberal states on the other. That order was supposedly rules-based, informed by international law and was what would allow smaller countries to function with their sovereignty intact.
While one could argue that there have been many who attempted to strengthen international law as a function of international relations, to claim that there ever really was such an order — or to insist that Western countries, en masse, bought into it completely — well, that is simply not true. There are scores of examples that show otherwise, and one needn’t look too far back to find them.
If one considers what international law is supposed to mean on the ground, or in terms of state sovereignty, they ought to ask where it was when it came to Syria and its immediate neighborhood, or when different Muslim groups were so abysmally treated by Beijing? How does one explain the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, now being described as “apartheid,” or the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014? Lest we forget, Ukraine is a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations — and even membership to these pillars of international order could not protect it from a Russian invasion.
The notion of a unipolar world, where a rules-based liberal international order, underpinned by international law is, in essence, the fundamental organizational principle of international relations, is simply not real. That’s the bad news. The good news, however, is that enough people believing it should be the fundamental principle underlying international relations has been enough to make a difference in the world.
But as time goes on, fewer of those in positions of authority continue to believe in the principle of international law deeply enough. And as the vacuum in whatever constitutes international order continues to grow, two major powers — China and Russia — continue to not only challenge but also provide alternatives to the existing system.
The reality is that international order has not been anything akin to “unipolar” for several decades now. We have been living in a multipolar world for many years. There are those who welcome this, hoping, perhaps, that a more multipolar world will be a more just one. A world where power is more fragmented, so potentially more evenly spread out, and as a result, all are forced to come together on the basis of genuine common purpose for the world at large.
However, none of that is particularly likely, and that is for two major reasons: The first is that, for all its immense flaws, the U.S. is still the most powerful actor on the international stage that could, even if theoretically — and very minimally — push for a notion of genuine common purpose, and it is clearly drawing back. “America first” may have been President Donald Trump’s brusque way of expressing the American establishment’s views on international engagement, but he wasn’t alone in this sentiment. Indeed, as we watch the nature of NATO’s withdrawal, European politicians recognize that “common purpose” does not even extend to the closest U.S. allies, let alone the rest of the world.
The second is that there is a competing vision on the rise, as even when paying attention to joint conflicts, such as relations with Russia, Europe continues to splinter rather than hold a united front. Domestically, Europeans — and Westerners more generally — face a tremendous threat from within, the mainstreaming of far-right populism, and this will continue to cause incredible damage to our Continent.
But worse still is another vision altogether — one that comes from China. For all the anti-imperialism talk regarding the West — which does have a great deal to answer for, be it in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere — there seems to be far too little realization of what Chinese imperialism or, on a lesser scale of importance, Russian imperialism, could look like in the years to come. If Russia’s role in Syria, or Beijing’s policies regarding the Uyghurs, are anything to go by, as the West becomes more isolationist, any new “world order” formed on the basis of a joint Sino-Russian imperative could likely look considerably worse than even the flawed and hypocritical order of today.
Of course, many U.S. allies realize that this new Sino-Russian order is on the rise, which is why so many in Europe, and in the broader Arab world, are forging new links with Beijing and Moscow. It’s almost amusing to hear European leaders continue to talk about NATO, when NATO members are openly crafting alternative arrangements with Moscow — no doubt, that kind of attitude will continue.
In Europe, perhaps we ought to learn a bit from how different powers in the Arab world are responding to their correct impression that the U.S. is beginning to deprioritize its relationship to their region. That’s not to say that we should emulate them; on the contrary, many in the Arab world have doubled down on a securitized response to the challenges they face domestically, as they build greater relationships with Moscow and Beijing internationally. But they have got one thing right – they have recognized that they must do something to protect what they perceive to be their interests.
Do we in Europe have the same recognition? Are we simply assuming that “America first” is going to change into “America for international law” in a few years? Are we underestimating the potential for what comes next? We ought not to be naïve about what the last 20 years have provided. It was full of flaws, errors, hypocrisy and more. But let us also not be naïve about the idea that any kind of rules-based international order is going to come from China or Russia.
America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan hasn’t created a massive earthquake in some kind of mythical, perfect international order; that’s true. But it should serve as a reminder to those who truly believe in a rules-based order that they are going to have to figure out, rather quickly, how to avoid a new Sino-Russian order by default. And that is definitely something to be concerned about.
Source: Politico
