Tobias Heidland is a professor of economics at Kiel University and the Kiel Institute’s director of international development. Jasper Tjaden is a professor of applied social research and public policy at the University of Potsdam.
As the deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan approaches, all across the EU, countries are still scrambling to evacuate their former local staff from Kabul. Thousands of clerks, drivers and interpreters who worked for Western governments now fear for their lives, while politicians from many European countries have repeatedly brought up fears of reliving the 2015 refugee crisis.
Causing “another 2015” by signaling openness is a widespread concern for many in the EU, including Germany. In late June, even before Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban, a majority in parliament had already voted against a more generous admission policy for local staff who had assisted Germany. Across the aisle, the view persisted that easing visa restrictions for Afghans would create a “pull effect,” leading to much larger refugee flows. But is such leniency likely to create a significant and lasting pull effect? The answer is simple: No.
It is important to keep in mind that 2021 is not 2015. Refugees being airlifted from Kabul are fleeing the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. By contrast, most Syrian refugees coming to Germany in 2015 had left from Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan, where they were already living in camps or informal arrangements for months, or even years. Nonetheless, 2015 can teach us much about so-called pull effects, as well as the impact of actual policies and potentially misleading narratives.
Doing just that, a study we recently published, analyzed the impact of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2015 decision, which allowed thousands of asylum seekers to cross the border into Germany, after the suspension of the Dublin Regulation. At the time, Merkel’s selfies with refugees went viral, reinforcing the impression that Germany had embraced them with open arms. In total, 1.2 million asylum seekers arrived in Germany in 2015 and 2016.
At the same time, however, Merkel faced mass criticism over her decision — criticism from inside her own party, various government agencies and the increasingly successful far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Just like today, the fear was that signaling an open-door policy to refugees would cause mass immigration that would be impossible to control.
Six years later, we can now look back and take stock. Analyzing the numbers on asylum applications, immigration, migration intentions and Google searches, we studied data from Germany, comparable EU destination countries and the most relevant regions of origin. And while the refugee crisis has undoubtedly had a lasting effect on the country’s political landscape, there is no evidence of a pull effect.
In reality, Merkel’s 2015 decision marked the culmination of a process that had already started in 2010 and 2011. Surveys taken in origin countries around the time of the decision actually showed no increase in the number of those reporting they wanted to migrate to Germany, and within a few months, actual migration to the country decreased significantly: quickly falling below levels seen before the summer of 2015.
So why did the alleged “Merkel effect” never materialize? Mostly because these fears were exaggerated. Leaving one’s country is one of the most important decisions a person will make in their lifetime. It does not happen in a vacuum, and migrants adjust to changing contexts — and the context changed quickly after September 2015.
Germany, and many other European countries, underwent a swift and restrictive turn in their migration policies. The ongoing EU-Turkey deal is one of the more well-known examples of new restrictions that were introduced at that time. Germany also declared “safe countries” of origin to which migrants could be expeditiously returned, and funding for the European border and coast guard agency, Frontex, was increased dramatically.
The EU also massively increased funding for countries in the Middle East, hosting millions of refugees, in order to reduce pressures for onward migration. From 2012 to 2015 European governments had failed to sufficiently respond to distress calls warning of funding gaps, as well as the dramatic situation and deteriorating conditions in many of the camps because of it. The eventual increase in funding allowed those who had recently made it across the Syrian border to stay in those camps rather than risk their lives in rubber boats heading to Europe.
Additionally, the intensity of the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan decreased compared to the pre-2015 period. And many potential migrants simply could not afford a journey to Germany, even if they had heard about Merkel’s migrant-friendly policy (and ignored all the unfriendly changes that followed shortly after).
The present situation unfolding in Afghanistan reminds many of 2015. But looking back, it is clear that welcoming refugees does not necessarily mean attracting more in the long run, and fears of creating a pull effect by appearing welcoming under exceptional circumstances are overblown.
The German case clearly shows states’ capacity to regulate migration, even after declaring a “migrant-friendly” stance. And when it comes to Afghanistan, the situation is even more straightforward, as evacuations are restricted to those who supported Western forces. However, in the end, Merkel’s decision did have one crucial outcome that shouldn’t be ignored: It provided safety and better living conditions for millions fleeing from war.
How EU countries should treat their local Afghan staff after the withdrawal of remaining NATO forces has been the subject of intense debate for months now. However, confronted with such a historical loss of face after failing to provide a peaceful and orderly transition in Afghanistan, EU member countries should, at the very least, ensure refugee protection for those who assisted them. There may be reasons to be hesitant but concern that it would attract more migrants should not be one of them.
Source: Politico
