The ongoing war in Ukraine has fundamentally rewritten the rules of modern combat, moving the battlefield decisively from the ground to the air. According to Ukrainian soldiers with direct frontline experience, the era of traditional, heavy armor dominating warfare is over. Corporal Dmytro Zhluktenko, a combat lessons analyst with Ukraine’s 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment, starkly noted, “In the past year, I’ve seen one tank on the battlefield.” He critiques military doctrines that still prioritize such assets, arguing that warfare has transformed so dramatically since 2022 that old approaches are now obsolete. The rapid, iterative evolution of drone technology means these systems can be adapted and acquired continuously, unlike the lengthy procurement cycles for traditional hardware. This represents a profound shift in both approach and doctrine, one that many established militaries have yet to fully grasp.
Germany, prompted by Russia’s invasion, has embarked on a historic military overhaul, a Zeitenwende or turning point, significantly increasing defence spending to rebuild its Bundeswehr. This effort includes substantial investments in traditional capabilities, such as deploying a new brigade of Leopard 2A8 tanks to Lithuania. However, Ukrainian drone officers from the same regiment assert that this focus remains misaligned with the realities of the current war. Captain Oleksandr Voitko, the unit’s deputy commander, stated bluntly, “I saw too many problems in the German army as speaking about drones.” He emphasizes that armies now need “as many FPV kamikaze drones as bullets,” treating them as essential, consumable ammunition produced proactively, not as last-minute additions. The “last moment,” Voitko warns, is when you are already engaged with an enemy, and by then, it is too late to scale production.
The specific gap identified by the Ukrainians is not just in drones, but in the types that have proven most lethal on their battlefield. While the Bundeswehr possesses some advanced, high-tech systems, it critically lacks substantial quantities of the two most effective instruments against enemy infantry: FPV (First Person View) kamikaze drones and bomber drones that drop grenades. Voitko estimates that “80% of Russian infantry in Ukraine is destroyed by these two types of drones.” This capability, he argues, is not currently on the German agenda, yet it is indispensable for defending, for example, the Baltic states against a potential Russian attack. Corporal Zhluktenko adds, “Right now, Germany is not prepared to face this type of warfare that Russia has mastered in Ukraine.” Furthermore, quantity is as crucial as quality. Against a large army like Russia’s, which can absorb high losses, you need a massive volume of drones to achieve decisive effects. Having a limited number of excellent drones, Voitko explains, will result in a loss rate the enemy can afford—and you will not win.
Beyond hardware, a pressing issue is the human expertise required to wield it effectively. Captain Voitko pointedly asks, “I don’t know how many well-trained pilots the German army has now. I don’t think many.” Recognizing this, the German defence ministry plans to integrate drone operation into basic training later this year. The Ukrainian officers offer a direct solution: they are ready to train German troops themselves. Captain Markiian Yatsyniak confirmed that Ukrainian instructors, certified and with frontline experience, could provide training either by coming to Germany or, more efficiently, by hosting German soldiers in Ukraine for the “full spectrum of training services.” This knowledge transfer is already happening in a limited form, underscoring the urgency of the need.
Indeed, a foundational agreement between German and Ukrainian defence ministries in February 2024 has enabled Ukrainian soldiers with combat experience to instruct Bundeswehr personnel at German army schools. The focus is on tactics, drone defence, and frontline lessons. Lieutenant General Dr. Christian Freuding, inspector of the German army, acknowledged, “Right now, there is nobody better to learn this from than the Ukrainians.” Ukrainian instructors are already active at several specialized schools, with plans to expand this programme widely across the army. This collaboration is not merely bilateral aid; it is a strategic investment in shared defence knowledge.
Ultimately, the Ukrainian officers frame this exchange of hard-earned expertise as a matter of collective European and NATO security. The war has created two militaries uniquely proficient in drone-centric warfare: Ukraine and Russia. For other nations to deter future aggression, they must attain a similar level of capability. Corporal Zhluktenko puts it plainly: “We all together are only able to defend ourselves and our continent if we are working together.” The implicit message is that the security of the alliance depends on all members being “as strong as we are at the moment.” The lessons from Ukraine are not just tactical insights; they are a blueprint for modern collective defence, urging a doctrinal and industrial shift from traditional platforms to the scalable, adaptive, and prolific systems that now define the battlefield.
