The European peace order has been fundamentally shattered by Vladimir Putin’s criminal war of aggression against Ukraine. This brutal conflict, unfolding on our continent’s doorstep, is more than a regional crisis; it is a direct assault on the principles of sovereignty and international law that Europe is built upon. The sheer scale of human suffering and geopolitical upheaval demands a response that matches the gravity of the moment. Yet, even as Europe grapples with this existential threat from the East, a profound uncertainty is growing from the West. The policies of US President Donald Trump—marked by trade conflicts and open provocations—have cast a deep shadow over the future reliability of American security guarantees. This dual pressure, from a belligerent Russia and a potentially retreating America, creates an unprecedented moment of peril. In this fragile landscape, effective and united action from the European Union is not merely an option; it is an urgent necessity for its own survival and sovereignty.
However, the EU’s capacity to act decisively is paralysed by a critical structural flaw: the principle of unanimity in foreign and security policy. This requirement for consensus among all 27 member states, while intended to protect national interests, has become a major obstacle to strategic coherence and swift action. In a world defined by rapid aggression and hybrid threats, the ability to haggle and veto is a luxury Europe can no longer afford. The existing treaties do theoretically allow the European Council to switch to majority voting, but only by a unanimous decision—a paradox that ensures stagnation. Pursuing a full treaty amendment to solve this would be a years-long odyssey, time that Europe simply does not have. Therefore, we must confront a stark reality: clinging to outdated procedures in the name of unity is making the Union collectively weaker and more vulnerable. A different, more pragmatic path must be forged to overcome this self-imposed constraint.
The prerequisite for any meaningful reform is a cold, realistic assessment of Europe’s strategic situation. We must have the courage to consider the previously unthinkable—a genuine decoupling of the United States from European security—precisely to mobilize all efforts to avoid it. Wishful thinking is not a strategy. It is clear that the normative power of European law and values means little if it cannot be defended. International order requires not just legal frameworks but the credible capability to enforce them. Therefore, the foundation of any new European sovereignty must be a unified and robust defence capability. To achieve this, the member states that are ready and willing to advance should adopt a pioneering “intergovernmental agreement.” This agreement, existing alongside the existing treaties, would enable majority decisions on foreign and security policy among its signatories, breaking the veto logjam and creating a nucleus for decisive action.
The participants in this enhanced cooperation would form a “European Security Council,” constituting a union within the Union. This council would be the primary body for taking all relevant foreign and security policy decisions, operating on a model similar to the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure: decisions would require the support of 55% of the participating states representing 65% of their combined population. This ensures decisions reflect both majority will and demographic weight. Crucially, this is more ambitious than ad-hoc “coalitions of the willing,” which change with every crisis, and avoids the divisive static hierarchy of a predefined “core Europe.” The door to participation would remain permanently open to all member states, with the constant aim of achieving the widest possible consensus. But when unanimity among all 27 proves impossible, this core group would retain the ability to act, ensuring Europe is never again held hostage by a single veto.
This “European Security Council” should be composed of the heads of state and government from the participating nations, joined by the presidents of the key European institutions: the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, as well as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs. This structure balances the essential role of member states as the primary actors with the need for a communitarian, federal impulse from the EU institutions. It is a model designed to be compatible with diverse national interests while finally enabling the speed and resolve of collective action. The inclusion of the Parliament and Commission ensures democratic accountability and policy continuity, moving European defence beyond purely intergovernmental horse-trading toward a more integrated and strategic common policy.
The ultimate goal of this transformation is crystal clear: Europe must become stronger to safeguard its future. For Germany and the EU, this necessitates a definitive strategic prioritization. Building a true European Defence Union must stand alongside resolute support for Ukraine as the twin pillars of our policy. Crucially, this is not an alternative to transatlantic partnership but its necessary revitalization. We must convincingly communicate to our American allies that a militarily capable and strategically autonomous Europe is a stronger, more reliable partner. A Europe that can shoulder its own defence burden reinforces the NATO alliance and secures our shared democratic interests. The path forward is therefore defined by a dual imperative: we must remain steadfastly Atlantic in our alliance, while becoming decisively more European in our capabilities and resolve. Our security, and our sovereignty, depend on it.
