In a candid address at the EIT Raw Materials Summit in Brussels, a senior European official framed the global contest for minerals not as a simple quest for resources, but as a fundamental struggle for geopolitical power. Koen Doens, of the European Commission’s international partnerships department, warned that the European Union’s overwhelming dependence on China for critical raw materials has created a vulnerability that threatens the entire bloc’s green transition and economic future. He argued that power in the 21st century will belong to those who control the entire industrial chain—from extraction and refining to manufacturing and setting global standards—much as control over oil and gas defined influence in the previous century. For Europe, therefore, achieving strategic autonomy in this arena is not a defensive cost but a vital investment in its long-term resilience and sovereignty.
This alarming analysis is underscored by stark statistics: China currently accounts for roughly 60% of global production of critical raw materials and a staggering 90% of refining capacity. For specific elements, the EU’s dependence is even more acute, relying on Beijing for about 98% of its rare-earth magnets, which are essential for everything from electric vehicles to wind turbines. Recent years have seen China leverage this dominance, including through export restrictions on rare earths to the EU as recently as 2025, highlighting how supply can be weaponized. In response, the EU has set ambitious 2030 targets for domestic extraction, refining, and recycling, and has forged over a dozen international partnerships with resource-rich nations from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Zambia under its Global Gateway initiative, aiming to offer an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Yet, as experts from the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) point out, securing mining partnerships abroad is only a partial solution. The true source of Chinese power lies in its monolithic control over the mid-processing stages—the complex, often polluting work of turning raw ore into usable industrial materials. To dismantle this dominance, the EU ISS proposes a radical shift: forging an “allied industrial bloc” with like-minded democracies and resource holders, focused not just on trade but on co-investing in shared, secure supply chains. This coalition would extend to major producers like Brazil and Indonesia, and to nations with vast skilled workforces like India, creating a network designed to reduce collective exposure to Chinese leverage and building refining capacity within allied territories.
Concurrently, the think tank argues Europe must make a politically difficult but strategically necessary investment in rebuilding its own domestic refining and processing infrastructure, even if higher environmental and labor costs make it less immediately competitive. This must be coupled with the establishment of strategic reserves of critical minerals, akin to national oil reserves, to buffer against sudden embargoes or geopolitical shocks, such as a crisis over Taiwan. Perhaps the most contentious recommendation is the acknowledgement that Europe’s own regulatory and democratic processes—notably lengthy permitting procedures and fragmented environmental rules—are ill-suited to the current geopolitical urgency and may need to be streamlined to compete with state-directed rivals.
This tension between strategic urgency and environmental protection has now moved to the forefront of the EU’s internal debate. The European Commission, in a bid to fast-track domestic mining projects, has recently proposed reopening aspects of the cornerstone EU Water Framework Directive, arguing that existing rules hinder the “de-risking” of supply chains. This move has sparked significant pushback, with 27 Members of the European Parliament warning in a letter that tampering with water protections sends a dangerous signal amid growing water stress and climate risks, and undermines the very sustainability goals the green transition is meant to advance.
Despite this clash, the Commission’s resolve appears firm. Officials like Doens emphasize that the premium paid for security and strategic autonomy today is an insurance policy against being held hostage tomorrow. The path forward, as articulated, is fraught with hard choices: balancing environmental integrity with industrial revival, navigating democratic deliberation against the need for speed, and building complex international alliances while reinvesting at home. The EU’s race for critical raw materials is ultimately a race to redefine its own future—determining whether it will remain a rule-setter in the new industrial landscape or become permanently subject to the power of those who control the foundational elements of the modern world.
